Abstract-The complexity of physical protection systems has increased to address modern threats to national security and emerging commercial technologies. A key element of modern physical protection systems is the data presented to the human operator used for rapid determination of the cause of an alarm, whether false (e.g., caused by an animal, debris, etc.) or real (e.g., a human adversary). Alarm assessment (the human validation of a sensor alarm) primarily relies on imaging technologies and video systems. Developing measures of effectiveness (MOE) that drive the design or evaluation of a video system or technology becomes a challenge, given the subjectivity of the application (e.g., alarm assessment). Sandia National Laboratories has conducted empirical analysis using field test data and mathematical models such as binomial distribution and Johnson target transfer functions to develop MOEs for video system technologies. Depending on the technology, the task of the security operator and the distance to the target, the Probability of Assessment (PAs) can be determined as a function of a variety of conditions or assumptions. PAs used as an MOE allows the systems engineer to conduct trade studies, make informed design decisions, or evaluate new higher-risk technologies.
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This paper outlines general video system design trade-offs, discusses ways video can be used to increase system performance, and lists MOEs for video systems used in subjective applications such as alarm assessment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Sandia National Laboratories' approach to physical protection is that one cannot claim to have achieved adversarial detection unless one has received an alarm indication followed by the assessment, of the alarm source.
This paper focuses on the video system for the task of alarm assessment within the context of intrusion detection. This paper introduces PAs and its empirical determination using two 978-1-4244-7402-811 0/$26.00 ©20 1 0 IEEE II.
Context of Assessment
In high-security applications, the physical protection system (PPS) detects and responds to an attack before the adversarial objective is met. In the event of an attack, the PPS engages in a relay race against the adversarial timeline, where each leg in the race is a subsystem (i.e., detection and response) operating interdependently and in sequence. Although the race starts with an intruder entering the protected area, the PPS is not engaged until the intruder is detected. If the PPS timeline is greater than the adversarial timeline, the PPS fails.
Detection, within the context of a PPS, consists of the sensing, communication, and assessment of alarm events. The sensor triggers an alarm based on potential human activity within the bounds and conditions established by the sensor technology. For most sensors, the alarm stimuli can originate from sources other than human (e.g., animal, debris, etc.) thereby reducing the confidence in the alarm. In some cases, even if a human is the source of the alarm, adversarial intent may still need to be determined in order to scope the means and method of response. Upon receiving alarm notification, the alarm source is therefore to be assessed by a human visual means, whether hostile or not. It is only until the alarm is accurately assessed that detection is achieved.
Within the context of the PPS timeline, if senSing and alarm communication are assumed to be automated, the process of alarm assessment will contribute the most time to detection due mostly to human factors. Therefore, if one seeks to minimize the time to detect intrusions, one works to minimize the time to assess alarms. While there are several techniques for alarm assessment, such as roving patrols, guard towers, and/or event-based guard deployment, the most effective technique uses a properly designed video system tightly integrated with PPS alarms that a relayed to a central, protected location.
III.

Probability of Assessment, PAS
The metric for evaluating the overall detection performance of the PPS is the probability of detection (Po). Po of a PPS is the product of the probability that a sensor produces an alarm from a certain adversarial intrusion (probability of sensing, Ps), the probability that the alarm is effectively transmitted and received (probability of communication, Pc), and the probability of accurate assessment of the adversarial intrusion (PAs). This relationship can be expressed with the following equation:
(1 ) Similarly, the time to detection is cumulative, as follows:
It is important to note that Po is dependent on the threat to the protected asset and is expressed either as a function of a set of intrusion scenarios or as a single, comprehensive value.
While the PPS functions to detect a range of human activity,
PAs is discussed here as a function of a single human running, walking, or crawling. The task of assessment is to distinguish a human from an object of equal distance, size, and speed.
IV. Assessment Performance Variables
Several independent variables affect the performance of the assessment video system. In a regression model, the independent variables are controllable in order to measure the impact to the dependent variable, i.e., PAs. These include the following:
• Physical region to be covered. 
Where WI' is the camera's scene width, WI is the camera's imager width (mm), D is the distance from the camera to the intruder, FL is the camera lens focal length (mm).
• The human intruder.
To evaluate the ability to distinguish a human from an object, we first classify the human in terms of size, direction of travel relative to the viewing perspective, and speed (Table I ).
• Video image quality. Regardless of lighting conditions, the imaging technology (e.g., visible light or thermal IR), the method of capture, distribution and display, and the quality of the video system is the degree to which it is capable of displaying fine detail. Resolution is the metric for video quality and is expressed in terms of horizontal television lines (HTVL). HTVL is measured using test charts featuring a set of vertical dark and light line transitions converging from top to bottom or from bottom to top of the video display. 
Where fs is spatial frequency, R is the system resolution, and WF is the camera's scene width. Spatial frequency can be used as a design measure of effectiveness.
• Video frame rate. The ability to distribute live and pre recorded video at a suitable frame rate is critical to the assessment of transient objects. For instance, if the running intruder passes through a 20-ft region at 20 ftIs and the video system's frame rate is 1 frame per second (fps), it is likely the intruder will not be captured by the camera or the image will appear as a hard-to-perceive blur. Frame-rate bottlenecks can occur in the camera, transmission network, video distribution hubs, or the display. Cameras, distribution hubs (or media servers), and display workstations have limited processing resources that can create a trade-off space between storage, resolution, and frame rate needs. A corollary issue to frame rate is camera exposure times. For low light applications, higher exposure times are needed. Some cameras using an image sensor that is sensitivity constrained attempts to achieve better low-light performance by integrating and averaging several successive frames. For a static scene, the imagery appears fine. Successive frames, however, blur moving objects and consequently degrade the frame rate.
• Integration of the video system with alarm data. To minimize the time to assess alarms, video and alarm data are collocated, to be presented to an operator together at the moment of alarm notification. In addition to presenting alarm-based live video, playback of pre recorded video of the alarm event is vital to address operator error, multiple alarm events, and the capture of transient sources in a sensor region limited in physical space. To achieve this, continuous coverage of the sensor region and a small yet continuous recording buffer is required.
V.
The Binomial Distribution Model to Determine PAs
With the independent variables identified, PAs can be determined empirically using the binomial distribution of a series of yes/no experiments referred to as Bernoulli trials. The binomial distribution is a useful model in various scientific disciplines.
Experiments that yield attribute data (e.g., favorable or unfavorable, success or failure, reliable or unreliable, etc.), can often be analyzed using this distribution as the underlying probabilistic model. Within this context, PAs is defined as the proportion of favorable outcomes in a statistical population within a certain confidence interval. For high-security applications, SNL's approach to such experiments has been conservative by selecting the lower end of the confidence interval with> 95% coverage of the interval at a 95% confidence [1]. SNL's experiments to determine PAs using a binomial distribution model is as follows.
A series of pre-recorded video clips, each featuring one or more of the independent variables impacting assessment (e.g., resolution, frame rate, HFOV, lighting, etc.) are displayed before several observers. For instance, a 500 HTVL video clip at 5 fps features a camera with an HFOV of 20 degrees, viewing a runner moving across the scene, at a distance of 300 ft.
In order to determine the impact a particular variable has on assessment, subsequent video clips feature changes to the variable, e.g., a 300 HTVL from 500 HTVL, while keeping the remaining variables constant. The number of observers gives the sample size in the binomial distribution and determines the confidence level for calculating
PAs.
Observers are provided with questionnaires and instructions to assume the role of a PPS operator, to treat each video clip as containing a potential alarm source and to select one out of multiple choices to assess the cause of the "alarm." Each clip for each observer is therefore associated with either a 1 (pass) or a 0 (fail) depending on whether the observer has correctly recognized the subject of the scene. For each clip, the ratio of the sum of the answers to the number of observers is used in the binomial distribution to determine PAs at a confidence level of 95%. For instance, a video clip featuring a small animal yielded 35 out of 40 observers correctly recognizing the subject in the clip as an animal. PAs at a 95% confidence level would be 0.73 for this case.
SNL has adapted this methodology to evaluate a range of video imaging technologies, including visible light, long-wave infrared and underwater acoustic cameras. Early evaluations of visible light technology used static images (rather than video clips) of animals, debris, human runners, walkers and crawlers, and empty scenes at varying distances and under varying lighting conditions. While fixing video resolution and HFOV, up to 40 observers were selected. For each image, questionnaires instructed observers to assess the image based on the following choices: human, animal, debris, or unknown.
PAs was determined as a function of spatial frequency (HTVLlft) under different lighting and contrast conditions. Based on this analysis, general design criteria were developed that could be applied to video systems using visible light cameras. PAs (at 95% confidence level) was found to be optimized (i.e., between 90% and 95%) when the spatial frequency at all locations within the physical region was no less than 6 HTVLlft. That is, PAs is optimized when system resolution is no less than 6 times the width of the camera's field of view (i.e., WF) at the furthest distance (i.e., D). Fig. 1 shows still images from cameras with different resolutions, i.e., a human crawler at spatial frequencies of 6 HTVLlft and 2 HTVLlft. This assumes contrast optimization by applying neutral gray ground covering, thus providing a scene reflectance of 30% to 35% and, for nighttime operations, a minimum average illumination of no less than 1 foot candle and a maximum-to minimum light ratio of no more than 6:1.
Recent SNL evaluations were conducted using this methodology on thermal infrared technologies. A similar set of independent variables were used; however, they were manifested in different ways because of the phenomenology of thermal infrared. For instance, lighting conditions and background color affect image contrast and consequently resolution for visible light technologies; however, for thermal imagers, contrast varies with object-to-background temperature and emissivity differences. Collimator tubes with etched line patterns against thermal projectors were used to determine resolution. Due to the high expense of thermal collimators and the relatively small imager arrays, thermal imager evaluations equated pixels with HTVL for the basis resolution. The experiments were conducted using a similar process, i.e., video clips featuring independent variables presented to a variety of observers. For perimeter applications, four fixed thermal cameras were evaluated with different measured resolutions. With 35 observers reviewing approximately 135 video clips, PAs (at 95% confidence level) was plotted as a function of spatial frequency for runners, walkers, and crawlers (and objects of equivalent size, speed, and distance) under two different contrast conditions (high and low).
Since the crawler features the most challenging of intrusion scenarios to assess, Fig. 2 illustrates PAs (at 95% confidence level) for the thermal cameras tested as a function of spatial frequency for a crawler during high-contrast conditions. Fig.  2 shows that, assuming high contrast, spatial frequencies between 4.5 and 6 HTVLlft are needed to achieve a PAs (at 95% confidence level) of 90% to 95%. Data for walkers and runners (not shown) showed that approximately half the spatial frequency of the crawler (2.5 to 3 HTVLlft) is required to achieve the same PAs. To illustrate adjustments to the contrast variable, Fig. 3 shows a human walker at high contrast and at low contrast while spatial resolution is fixed. Spatial Frequency (Pixelslft) Fig. 2 . PAs (at 95% confidence level) for a thermal imager as a function of spatial frequency for a crawler at high contrast Based on this analysis, general design criteria were developed that could be applied to video systems using thermal imaging cameras for perimeter applications. PAs (at 95% confidence level) was found to be optimized (i.e., between 90% and 95%) when the spatial frequency at all locations within the physical region was no less than 4.5 HTVLlft. Six HTVLlft was recommended as an objective; however, no less than 4 HTVLlft as a threshold was determined to be acceptable depending on the intruder size expected to produce alarms. This assumes contrast optimization through exclusive use at night and a supplemental visible light camera (typically an order of magnitude less than the cost of thermal imager) for daytime assessment.
PAs vs Spatial Frequency for Crawlers at High Thermal Contrast
VI.
Johnson Criteria Model to Determine PAS The preceding section showed how the binomial distribution model is used in determining PAs and how PAs is expressed as a function of several independent variables. Analysis was used to derive MOEs, e.g., 6 HTVLlft minimum spatial frequency and 1 foot-candle minimum illumination. While the binomial distribution model is well suited for perimeter applications using fixed field-of-view cameras covering discrete sensor zones, extended detection applications feature the use of wide-area sensor coverage in often uncontrolled environments. The Johnson Criteria is useful to determine PAs for assessment of extended-detection sensors because it provides a means to predict PAs of a human intruder for all distances by empirically determining PAs for the same intruder at a single distance.
The Johnson Criteria were proposed by J. Johnson in the late 1950s as a methodology for predicting detection probabilities for targets with known background temperature differences, physical dimension, and range from the imaging system. The Johnson methodology has become known as the equivalent line pattern approach where, depending on the task (i.e., detection, recognition, or identification), there are an equivalent number of line pairs that can be resolved by an observer with a 50% probability, which is known as N50. N50 is used as a constant for what is referred to as the target transfer probability function:
Three basic observer tasks are identified in the Johnson model, each with an assigned N50:
• Detection -An object is present, e.g., Nso =1
• Recognition -The object is discerned from objects of similar distance, size, and speed, e.g., Nso = 4
• Identification -The object is discerned within a type, such as a man vs. woman, e.g., Nso = 8
The Johnson model's task of recognition then translates to the task of assessment and N (in terms of line pairs per object) translates to spatial frequency (in terms of HTVLlft). If we assume a one-dimensional intruder, spatial frequency is equal to two line pairs. Based on the Nyquist sampling theorem, two HTVL equals one line pair. Assuming a one dimensional object, two HTVLlft is the same as N=1. Therefore, we find N by dividing spatial frequency in terms of HTVLlft by 2, or Is. Using this relationship, Nso isdetermined empirically as a function of the independent variables. The experiments for long-distance assessment leverage a technique used to characterize the minimum resolvable temperature difference for thermal imaging cameras. For walkers and runners, the procedures are summarized as follows:
• Select several observers to participate.
• Provide reference images of recognizable intruders.
• Begin tests with a test intruder retreating away from the camera's position. The farther the intruder is from the camera, the less detail is available to make an assessment.
• Have observers compare the retreating intruder to the reference imagery and use their judgment to determine the pOint at which the intruder loses the recognizable features necessary for assessment and the distance of the intruder from the camera is recorded.
• Have the intruder approach the camera. The closer the intruder is, the more detail becomes available to make an assessment. As with the retreating scenario, the advancing intruder's distance is recorded the mo ment the observers determine the intruder is a recognizable human.
This procedure is repeated with multiple observers under varying conditions. With the distance, the camera reso lution (HTVL), imager width (WI) and lens focal length (FL), the spatial frequency (fs) for each trial in the experiment can be determined and translated to Nso. PN can then be expressed as a function of distance, D, by substituting JI for N and solving equations (3) and (4) HTVLlft, (an Nso of 2), Fig. 4 shows PAs plotted as a function of range for a specified set of independent variables.
Based on the Johnson criteria model, the distance at PAs of 50% is used to determine distances at the desired PAs.
Using equations (3) and (4), spatial frequency at the design PAs can be determined. While using this model, recent experiments with long-range thermal imaging technologies determined that spatial resolutions between 4 and 6 HTVLlft are needed to assess human walkers and runners at a PAs of 90% to 95%. 
VII. Conclusion
Within the context of the overall PPS time line versus the adversarial timeline, it is important for the system designer to consider the proper design of a video system to reduce the time to assess alarms. PAs, determined empirically using binomial distribution and Johnson criteria models, was optimized by applying several design MOEs to drive the effective video design supporting the accurate assessment of human runners, walkers, and crawlers. The appropriate design MOEs follow:
1. Sensor coverage: Design with a camera and lens combination to ensure -100% coverage of the sensor region.
2. Spatial frequency: Design with lens and camera, system resolution, and max distance to the intruder to ensure the spatial frequency no less than 4 to 6
